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Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 
2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the 
Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival 
on human space flight missions.  These lessons were 
presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace 
Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in 
Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in 
Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and 
identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again 
in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space 
flight.  As we embark on the development of new 
spacefaring vehicles through both government and 
commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human 
Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make 
this information available to a wider audience engaged in the 
design and development of future space vehicles.  Loss of 
Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts 
of the Columbia mishap process—the response, recovery, 
identification, investigative studies, medical and legal 
forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to 
respond to spacecraft mishaps.  The goals of this book are to 
provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the 
Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and 
to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to 
capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures 
and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.  
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The Crew Survival Working Group - Ninety minutes after  
loss of signal, Admiral Harold W. Gheman, Jr., was named 
Chair of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
by the NASA Administrator.  Once formed, the CAIB 
appointed advisors to the chair to assist in the focus and 
management of the investigations.  These advisors 
included a chief flight surgeon (CFS) and medical 
consultant, James Bagian, M.D., a former astronaut and 
lead medical investigator for the Challenger accident that 
occurred in January 1986.  The CAIB requested the 
formation of the Crew Survival Working Group (CSWG), 
chaired by Dr. Bagian, to determine the cause of death of 
the crew and determine the “survival gap” (what 
equipment or procedures might have kept the crew alive).  
The CSWG report was  included as Appendix G.12 of the 
final CAIB report in October 2003. 
The Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report released 
in 2008 captured the lessons learned from the loss of 
Columbia and its crew and documented recommendations 
for improving crew survival for future human spaceflight 
vehicles.  The report identified the five potentially lethal 
events the crew experienced and addressed whether 
current technology existed that could have precluded the 
When STS-107’s flight was announced, the Space Shuttle Program was focused on assembling the International 
Space Station.  However, NASA decided to have this one last research-dedicated Space Shuttle mission using 
the SPACEHAB laboratory.  STS-107 research focused on the consequences of microgravity on physical and 
living systems.  The underlying goals were to enhance the well-being of people on earth using microgravity for 
basic scientific understanding with the expectation that this knowledge might enable scientists to build better 
spacecraft and to understand the human system.  Once the science was selected, NASA mission managers and 
the STS-107 crew worked with the investigators to ensure the highest quality of research.   
 
Columbia launched the morning of January 16, 2003 for the 16-day mission.  During ascent, foam debris from 
the external tank shed during the extreme conditions of launch and struck the left wing of Columbia 
exactly 81.9 seconds into the flight.  When it was recognized that Columbia had suffered a debris strike, 
analysis and engineering experts worked to identify the significance of this event for vehicle integrity. 
Because operational experience with previous foam debris strike events had shown that such strikes had 
never caused significant structural damage, this event was not considered mission critical and the flight 
continued uninterrupted.  
 
On the morning of February 1st, Columbia began her return to Earth. At 08:59:32 CST, no further 
telemetry was received form Columbia.  This moment would come to be known as the Loss of Signal. 
Within hours of the mishap, the Columbia Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) was activated, and by 3:30 PM 
CST members of the Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center teams were enroute to Barksdale 
Air Force Base (AFB), LA, the strategic command center for recovery operations.  The primary objective of 
the MIT medical team was to receive, analyze, identify and transport human remains to the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Dover AFB, DE.  Additionally, a team from the Office of the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner deployed to Barksdale AFB to begin preliminary examination of recovered remains.  
 
A disaster field office was established in Lufkin, Texas, to manage the crewmember recovery effort carried 
out by 2000 personnel. Search methods for the crew included line searches, dog and horse teams, and 
aerial spotters. As remains were discovered, they were photographed and catalogued by Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Evidence Response Teams (ERT).  Human remains were transported from the recovery 
point to Lufkin, TX, then to Barksdale AFB and subsequently flown to Dover AFB.  
 
The initial search area for crewmembers was 200 miles long and 50 miles wide. As recovery patterns 
emerged, the search area was redefined as a more manageable 60 mile x 5 mile corridor.  The final area 
was 25 miles x 1 mile.  
 
The first crewmember remains were transported from Lufkin, TX, to Barksdale AFB on February 2, 2003. 
Twelve days after the accident, all crewmembers had been identified.  The official search for remains was 
terminated on February 13th. 
Columbia’s reentry on February 1st initiated a sequence of events which resulted in loss of vehicle control 
at GMT 13:59:37.  The orbiter was rotating, pitching and rolling with a strong and consistent yaw 
component of the overall motion, but its “belly” was predominantly oriented to the velocity vector.  The 
left wing shed debris for a period of time and then departed the vehicle followed by the catastrophic 
event (CE): separation of the orbiter forebody from the midbody.  The crew module depressurized 
rapidly. The crew module catastrophic event (CMCE) involved the complete breakup of the crew module. 
The forensic medical findings of injuries incurred during and after the CE and the CMCE can be 
categorized as follows:  
1. Mechanical injuries incurred during the CE 
2. Depressurization injuries incurred after the CE 
3. Mechanical injuries  incurred after the CE and 
before the CMCE 
 
4. Thermal injuries incurred after the CMCE and 
exposure to the atmospheric environment 
5. Common injuries incurred during the CMCE 
and ground impact 
1. Cabin depressurization 
2. Exposure to a dynamic rotating environment with 
non-conformal helmets and a lack of upper body 
restraint 
 
3. Separation from the crew module and seats with 
associated forces, material interactions and 
thermal consequences  
4. Exposure to near vacuum, aerodynamic 
accelerations and cold temperatures  
5. Ground impact 
 
Loss of Signal Aeromedical Lessons 
Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space 
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http://ston.jsc.nasa.gov/collections/TRS/ 
SPACEHAB Research Double Module 
The foam strike on the leading edge of the wing at 
81.9 seconds after lift-off.  
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One of the lessons learned from the loss of the Space 
Shuttle Columbia was that root-cause investigations do 
not dig deep enough to trace the individual  crewmember 
experiences to determine the successes and failures of 
protective measures.  Past mishap investigations focused 
on determining the root cause of the mishap and 
preventing recurrence.  However, if the crewmembers 
were not identified in the causal chain of events, their 
experiences were not analyzed and lessons were lost. 
 
The crew survival in-depth investigation process 
supplements the root-cause investigation.  The crew 
survival investigation focus is different from that of the 
usual mishap investigation.  Specifically, the crew survival investigation team investigates the 
performance of the crew, crew protective equipment, crew-vehicle interfaces, emergency and crew 
survival systems, training, and procedures that are intended to protect the crew.  A crew survival 
specialist, with extensive mishap investigation and human factors training, leads the team.  Typical 
team members are a medical doctor, a pathologist, a legal representative, and specialists in 
structures, environmental control and life support systems, flight performance, and crew equipment 
(crew survival and emergency equipment and crew suits). 
 
The outcomes of the crew survival investigation are the awareness of factors and events that affected 
crew survivability and recommendations for improving crew survival for future human space flight. 
Honor Guard Protocol for Columbia 
Crewmembers at  Barksdale AFB 
Analysis of legal issues encountered during the recovery and investigation also resulted in valuable 
lessons learned for future spacecraft aircraft investigations. 
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